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Abstract 
 
Mexico, as other Latin American countries, undertook far-reaching economic reforms in 
the 1980s and 1990s in a wide array of areas: trade and industrial policy, foreign investment 
and capital account, privatization of public enterprises and deregulation of economic 
activities, among others. As a result of the new economic model, the Mexican economy 
experienced outstanding export growth, successful insertion into international dynamic 
markets and shift towards medium and high-technology industries. Yet productivity growth 
has been insufficient, leading to low and volatile economic growth. This paper examines 
the dynamics of productivity growth and in particular analyzes whether inter- and intra-
industry dynamics can account for sluggish productivity growth. It makes use of a shift-
share analysis, taking advantage of a recently published industry-level database developed 
by the Mexican National Statistics Office as part of the LA-KLEMS project. The paper 
shows that Mexico has experienced an unfinished structural change, where productivity 
growth within sectors has been insufficient to close the gap with its main trading partner, 
the United States. Moreover, despite a significant reallocation of hours worked across 
industries, its aggregate impact has been hampered by the fact that flows have been from 
industrial sectors with high labor productivity growth towards sectors with lower, or 
contracting, productivity growth. 
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Introduction 
 
There is a wide acknowledgement that structural change is needed for long-term economic 
development (ECLAC, 2012; Lin, 2012; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; UNIDO, 2009; 
Haussman and Rodrik, 2003). Since the industrial revolution, the rise of new economic 
powers has generally been driven by the structural transformation of their economies, 
characterized by the shift from primary production to manufacturing, or from 
manufacturing to services, and within manufacturing from natural-resource-based goods to 
medium and high-technology products (Lin, 2012; Memedovic and Iapadre, 2009). 
 
Structural change involves transforming the composition of output, international trade and 
employment (ECLAC, 2012). Through increasing productivity in existing activities, and 
moving towards more complex and technology-intensive sectors and processes, structural 
change is expected to lead to long-term economic growth, export competitiveness and well-
paid jobs. 
 
Mexico is an interesting case among emerging economies to study structural change over 
the last three decades. Since the mid-1980s, Mexico’s economic policies and overall 
development orientation underwent extensive changes. The underlying premise was to use 
exports (instead of the domestic market) as the engine of growth and the private sector 
(instead of the State) as the driver of the new machine (Cordero et al., 2009).  
 
As a result, the export and production structure were transformed significantly: in 1986, 
exports of primary goods represented 45.6% of total exports, and by 2012 they had 
decreased to 17.4%. In contrast, exports of medium and high-technology products increased 
from 33.0% to 61.8% of total exports in the same period (ECLAC, 2014a). This 
concentration on medium and high-technology products is higher than in any of the so-
called BRICS countries4; in China those products accounted for 56.9% of total exports in 
2012 (ECLAC, 2014a). Mexico has also gone through a successful insertion into high-
growth global markets and has shown remarkable export competitiveness. Its market share 
in total US imports, which is the largest import market in the world, rose from 6.1% in 
1990 to 12.2% in 2012, in spite of increasing Asian competition (ECLAC, 2014b). 
 
Yet Mexico has experienced low and volatile economic growth. Between 1990 and 2012, 
Mexico’s economy grew only at 2.2% annually on average. In addition, the percentage of 
population living in poverty conditions in 2012 was similar to that observed in 1992 (52%). 
 
Various authors have examined this weak association in Mexico between economic reforms 
and export growth, on the one hand, and economic growth, on the other. There is wide 
acknowledgement that it is closely associated with slow productivity growth (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2014; OECD, 2013; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2010; López-Córdova, 2003) and 
low domestic value added of manufacturing exports (De la Cruz, 2011; Padilla-Pérez and 
Hernández, 2010; Fujii, 2005). 
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This paper aims to analyze the first factor: the dynamics of productivity growth by sector 
and assess whether the structural transformation observed over the last two decades can 
account for sluggish productivity growth. The analysis decomposes labor productivity 
growth through the use of a standard shift-share analysis, taking advantage of a recently 
published industry-level database developed by the Mexican National Statistics Office 
(INEGI) as part of the LA-KLEMS project5 (INEGI, 2013; Aravena and Hofman 2014). 
The database consists of annual industry-level time-series of output, as well as labor, 
capital and intermediate inputs over the period 1990-2011. The level of disaggregation 
available in the database allows a detailed analysis of the dynamics of resource allocation 
across industries. To the best of our knowledge this study is the first to apply this 
methodology to analyze the Mexican case. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to show that Mexico has experienced an incomplete 
or unfinished structural growth over the last three decades. Although it has succeeded in 
diversifying its production matrix and shifting towards more technologically complex 
industries, productivity growth has been unsatisfactory and quite below that of its main 
trading partner, the United States. On the one hand, productivity growth within sectors has 
been sluggish in general, on the other, sectoral shifts have been characterized by the 
relocation from industries with high productivity expansion to those with low or negative 
rates of growth. 
 
The paper is divided into four further sections. The first section presents the main concepts 
used in this paper, in particular a detailed definition of structural change. It also gives 
further details of the database used to estimate productivity. The second section describes 
the main features of the Mexican economy under the economic model implemented in the 
previous three decades. The third section offers an in depth analysis of productivity growth 
by sector in Mexico and its comparison with US performance. The fourth section 
concludes. 
 
1. Conceptual framework and methodology 
 
Economic theory, since its origin, has given significant attention to structural change. For 
Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) the structural composition of the economy 
was strongly related to economic development and growth. By the same token, for 
economic development theory pioneers - such as Allan Fisher (1939), Hollis Chenery 
(1960), Arthur Lewis (1954), Luigi Pasinetti (1981) and Nicholas Kaldor (1957) - structural 
change is a key element for robust and sustainable growth. More recently, after the 
international 2008-2009 crisis, there has been a renewed interest in the quest for long-term 
economic growth and structural change has been brought to the fore again (e.g. ECLAC, 
2012; Lin, 2012; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). 
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 The LA-KLEMS Project is based on the EU-KLEMS Project developed by the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre for the European Union (Ref needed). The KLEMS growth and productivity accounts 
include measures of output growth, productivity, employment and skill creation, capital formation and 
technological change at the industry level. The input measures include various categories of capital (K), 
labour (L), energy (E), materials (M) and services (S). 
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Yet structural change has been understood in many different ways. Three main 
complementary definitions are here adopted. First, structural change results from 
innovations and increasing productivity in existing sectors, which may come from product, 
process and functional upgrading. Product upgrading is the development and 
commercialization of new or improved products with improved performance 
characteristics. Process upgrading involves the development and implementation of new or 
significantly improved production or delivery methods. Functional upgrading, in turn, 
means engaging in new and superior activities in the value chain, for instance, when a firm 
moves from components manufacturing to product design. 
 
Second, structural change has been commonly associated with long-term and persistent 
shifts in sectoral composition of economic systems. It entails modifications in the relative 
importance of different sectors over time, measured by their share in employment, output 
and trade (Memedovic and Iapadre, 2009). But more important for long-term economic 
growth, it is characterized by an increase in the contribution of knowledge-intensive sectors 
or activities to output and trade and a denser and more diversified production matrix 
(ECLAC, 2012). 
 
Third, structural change is also associated to insertion into high-growth global markets, 
leading to growing aggregate demand, production and job creation (ECLAC, 2012). 
Therefore, it entails a transformation towards sectors and activities that are increasingly 
demanded in global markets. Growing market share of international markets is a result of 
this transformation. 
 
Economic catching-up theories assert that to open an economy to international trade creates 
the conditions to develop local technological capabilities and increase productivity, 
therefore engaging in a structural change process. This is based on the expected positive 
effects that opening up to international trade has on technological capabilities through 
exports of goods, imports of intermediate and capital goods and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
 
The catching-up theory in its simple form asserts that being backward in productivity level 
carries a potential for rapid advance. The catching-up theory can be traced back to Veblen’s 
(1915) and Gerschenkron’s (1962) analyses of the process by which England was overtaken 
by other countries such as Germany and Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In comparisons across countries, growth rates of productivity over any long 
period tend to be inversely related to the initial level of productivity. The central idea has to 
do with the level of technology embodied in a country’s capital stock. The larger the 
technological gap, and therefore the productivity gap between leader and follower, the 
stronger the follower’s potential for growth in productivity. 
 
Yet, according to Abramovitz (1986), “a country’s potential for rapid growth is strong not 
when it is backward without qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward 
but socially advanced” (p. 388). Thus the catching up process is conditioned on what 
Abramovitz called “social capabilities”, which are related to education, institutions, and 
policies. Based partly on the results of Easterly and Levine (2001), which highlight the 
importance of differences in productivity in explaining cross-country income heterogeneity, 
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endogenous growth theory has further elaborated on the role of international trade and 
integration in the diffusion and absorption of technology (Keller, 2004). 
 
At its most abstract level, productivity refers to the volume of outputs that can be produced 
from a given bundle of inputs. Its relevance stems from the fact that sustained differences in 
the rate of growth of productivity explain a substantial portion of the heterogeneity 
observed in income levels across countries (IADB, 2010; Crespi, 2010; Easterly and 
Levine, 2001). Thus the analysis of its dynamics and its determinants is of the utmost 
importance from the perspective of development. 
 
The particular definition of productivity depends on the objective of measurement, as well 
as to the availability of data. Considering the close association between labor productivity 
and income per capita, this paper focuses on this measure which is defined as the quotient 
between value-added, expressed in constant terms, and the number of hours worked. 
 
The methodology used is a shift-share analysis of labor productivity (Fabricant, 1942). It 
allows the decomposition of changes in labor productivity into two components: pure-
productivity gains within industries (intra-sectoral or within change), and the effect due to 
the reallocation of resources across industries (inter-sectoral or between change). Following 
the work of Maudos et al. (2008), inter-sectoral changes in productivity are further 
decomposed into those which are due to the reallocation of resources to industries with 
higher productivity levels (static sectoral effect), and those due to the reallocation towards 
industries with higher rates of productivity growth (dynamic sectoral effect):  
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where  ⁄ −  ⁄  denotes aggregate labour productivity growth between periods T 
and 0, and 	, represent the share of hours worked in industry i as a proportion of total 
hours worked during period T:  	, ≡ 	, ∑ 	,	 =⁄ 	, ⁄ . 
 
The decomposition afforded by the shift-share analysis isolates the different sources of 
productivity growth. The first term on the right hand side measures the change in 
productivity that would have occurred solely due to improvements in efficiency within 
industries. Thus, it reflects changes in productivity that result from supply-side driven 
innovations within industries (Schumpeter, 1939), along the lines of the first definition of 
structural change presented above. The second term measures productivity changes that 
would have occurred only due to the flow of labor across industries. That is, it measures the 
demand-side induced reallocation of resources between sectors (Pasinetti, 1981). This 
second term correspond to both the second and the third definitions of structural change. 
Finally the third term measures the interaction between labor flows across industries, and 
the productivity gains within industries, in line with the first and second definitions of 
structural change. Positive values of this term reflect what Baumol (1967) called the 
structural bonus that results from labor shifts from low to high productivity industries.  
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2. Export competitiveness and industrial recomposition in Mexico over the last three 
decades 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico, as other Latin American countries, undertook a far 
reaching program of economic reforms in different areas: trade and industrial policy, 
foreign investment and capital account liberalization, privatization of public enterprises, 
and deregulation of domestic economic activities. 
 
Trade policy reform began with unilateral liberalization of international commerce in 1984. 
In 1986, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
government committed itself to maximum tariff rates and pledged to continue the 
replacement of import controls by tariffs. By the end of the 1980s, radical changes in the 
country’s trade policy had transformed Mexico from an almost closed economy to one of 
the most open in the world (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2009). Similarly, administrative 
regulations and restrictions for FDI in most sectors were abolished. 
 
In the 1980s, 1990s and the first decade of the 2000, Mexico was very active in negotiating 
and signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with various countries and regions. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with the United States and Canada, went into 
effect in January 1994. By 2013, FTAs had been signed with more than 40 countries, 
including the European Union, the European Free Trade Association, the five Central 
American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), Chile, 
Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia and Israel. 
 
As a result of this new economic model, Mexico’s exports have experienced an outstanding 
growth in the last two decades: between 1993 and 2013, they grew at an annual average 
rate of 10.5%. Mexico is by far the largest exporter in Latin America, contributing with 
one-third of total regional exports. In 2013, its exports amounted to US$ 380.2 billion, over 
and above Brazil’s US $242.2 billion.  
 
Export competitiveness, understood as an increasing market share, has been also 
noteworthy. In 2012, Mexico possessed 12.2% of total US imports market, in comparison 
with 6.9% in 1993, in spite of increasing Asian competition. Mexico is the third largest 
exporter to the US, just behind China and Canada. 
 
The export structure has undergone a significant transformation. Figure 1 shows exports by 
technology intensity. In 1986, when Mexico signed the GATT, primary products 
represented 45.6% of total exports, whereas high and medium-technology exports 
accounted for 33%. In 2012, the share of primary goods had reduced to 17.4%, while the 
latter reached 61.8%.6 This proportion of high and medium-technology goods is similar to 
                                                          
6
 This taxonomy is based on Lall (2000). It classifies industries according to their average expenditure on 
research and development. Primary products comprise fresh fruit, meat, rice, timber, petroleum and coffee, 
among others. Natural resource-based manufactures include prepared meals/fruits, beverages, vegetable oils, 
cement and glass, among others. Low-technology manufactures comprise textile fabrics, clothing, footwear, 
toys and furniture, among others. Medium-technology manufactures include passenger vehicles, synthetic 
fibres, plastics, and chemicals and paints, among others. And high-technology manufactures comprise data 
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that of Germany, and higher than that of countries with large research and development 
expenditures, such as Sweden and Finland. TV sets, mobile phones, computers and cars are 
among the most important exported products by Mexico. 
 
Figure 1 
Mexico: exports by technology intensity 
 
Source: ECLAC (Software SIGCI). 
 
Another indicator of the diversification of production structure is the total number of 
products exported. In 1986, Mexico exported 631 different goods (at four digits of the 
Standard International Trade Classification), while by 2012 the number had increased to 
745 (ECLAC, 2014a).  
 
Export growth was particularly robust in sectors that experienced a significant growth in 
global trade. In 2012, 53.7% of Mexico’s exports took place in sectors whose global trade 
grew above the average between 1990 and 2012 (COMTRADE, 2014). Indeed, its exports 
observed a significant increase not only in high-growth manufacturing goods, such as 
electronics and medical devices, but also in dynamic primary products such as oil, silver 
and flowers. 
 
Notwithstanding this positive export performance and a significant structural 
transformation, economic growth has been low and volatile. Between 1990 and 2012, 
Mexico’s economy grew only at 2.2% annually on average. In 2013, real GDP increased 
only 1.1%. Mexico has 45.5% of its population living in poverty conditions; that is 53.3 
millions. This ratio came down after 1995, but has climbed again in the last six years. In 
Chiapas and Guerrero, among the most backward states, nearly seven of every ten residents 
are poor. Income inequality has remained high over the last three decades. In 2012, the 
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GINI index was 0.5, similar to that observed in 1980, placing Mexico close to the average 
figure of Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.  
 
Over the last three decades Mexico’s economy has gone successfully through two out of 
three factors of structural change: composition of exports and positive insertion into global 
markets. However, this has not been enough to boost economic growth and improve overall 
social conditions. The following section studies in detail the third factor needed for a 
complete of structural change: productivity growth. 
 
 
3. Productivity growth and structural change 
 
The LA-KLEMS data for Mexico contain series for 62 industries over the period 1990-
2011. In order to benchmark the performance of labor productivity, the results are 
compared to those of the United States, using the dataset developed by Jorgenson et al. 
(2012) 7 8, which contains data for the period 1947-2010. Aside from the United States 
being the standard choice to benchmark the evolution of productivity growth, it is Mexico’s 
largest trading partner: in 2013, 78.8% of Mexico’s exports were sent to the US market. 
Moreover through NAFTA, the integration of certain sectors of the two countries’ 
economies, particularly manufacturing, over the period studied has been substantial. 
 
The top panel of figure 2 plots the annual GDP growth rates for Mexico and the United 
States. The first feature to note is that both series exhibit significant co-movement across 
the period studied, which reflects the extent of the linkages between both economies. The 
second aspect to remark is that economic growth in Mexico has been markedly more 
volatile, which in turn reflects the still elevated vulnerability of the Mexican economy to 
internal and external shocks. 
 
The bottom panel of figure 2 shows the evolution of labor productivity in both countries, 
where for comparison purposes the value for 1990 has been normalized to 100. The 
evolution of labor productivity in Mexico clearly reflects the volatility of aggregate growth. 
Moreover, while economic growth has been relatively similar over the 1990-2011 period 
labor productivity growth in Mexico has been lagging behind that of the United States, thus 
increasing the already sizeable productivity gap. 
 
The average annual growth rate of labor productivity in Mexico over the period 1990-2011 
was 1,0%, which is significantly slower than the rate of 1,7% of the United States. 
 
With respect to other middle income Latin American countries, Hofman et al. (2004) found 
that over the period 1995-207 labor productivity growth in Mexico doubled the rate found 
for Brazil (0,63%), but lagged behind those of Argentina (1,68%), Chile (2.56%) and the 
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 KLEMS data for both countries is built from official statistics, which use the North American Classification 
System (NACE). However, in order to maintain comparability with other analyses based on KLEMS data, we 
use the International Standard Industry Classification (Rev. 3) 
8
 Since price and volume data for the United States are chain-weighted, aggregation of industry-level volume 
data is carried out by constructing appropriate Thornqvist price indices to deflate current value series. 
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United States (2,02%). To put these growth rates into perspective they imply that whereas it 
would take 28 and 35 years for productivity levels in Chile and the United States, 
respectively, to double, it would take 43 years for Argentina, 60 years for the case of 
Mexico and over 100 years for Brazil! 
 
Figure 2 
Mexico and the United States 1990-2011: Growth and labour productivity 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on KLEMS data. 
 
The evolution of productivity highlights two main facts about the Mexican economy. First, 
shifts in sectoral composition and insertion into high-growth global markets have not been 
accompanied by rapid productivity growth. Therefore, it is here argued that Mexico has 
experienced an incomplete or unfinished structural change. Second, economic theory 
predicts that growing integration between two economies should result in convergence of 
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labor productivity, however the gap between US’ and Mexico’s productivity has widened 
over the last two decades.  
 
As is well known, countries in general go through phases of growth, stagnation and decline. 
Taking this into consideration, the shift-share decomposition for the growth periods 
identified within the sample for Mexico is computed, in addition to the results for the whole 
sample. The growth periods are bracketed by the occurrence of three crises, which resulted 
in recessions of varying magnitude in Mexico. The first occurred in 1995 associated to 
severe mismatches in the Mexican balance of payments. The second took place in 2001, as 
a consequence of the piercing of the so-called dot-com bubble in the United States. The 
final crisis spilled over from the United States to the global financial system in 2009.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the shift-share decomposition for both countries for the four identified 
growth periods, as well as for the whole sample. The figures in the top panel correspond to 
the annual average growth rates of each component, while those in the bottom panel are the 
contributions of each component to total change9. 
 
As previously noted, commencing with the full sample (column 5), the growth rate of labor 
productivity in Mexico is significantly smaller than the one observed for the United States. 
This reflects differences in both the relative importance of the components and in their 
respective growth rates. 
 
As for the relative importance of the components, inspection of the bottom panel of table 1 
shows that reflecting the differing level of development between the two countries, in the 
United States the totality of productivity growth originated in improvement within 
industries, while in Mexico 22% percent of productivity growth is accounted for by the 
flow of labor between industries.  
 
Hofman et al. (2014) find similar results when comparing develop and emerging 
economies: on average the contribution of the inter-industry effect on aggregate labour 
productivity change for Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom over the period 1995-2007 is less than one percent; 
whereas its contribution for Argentina and Chile are 16% and 11% respectively. 
 
Regarding the growth rate of the components, the expansion of the intra-industry effect in 
Mexico (0.8%) has been less than a half of the rate of the United States (1.8%). Although 
the growth rate of the inter-industry component in the United States is negative, its weight 
is negligible, whereas for Mexico its growth rate has averaged only 0.2%. On the one hand, 
both productivity and productivity growth diverge significantly between the United States 
and Mexico. Following catching-up theories, this gap should have given plenty of space to 
Mexico to increase its productivity growth rate. On the other, the United States, given its 
economic development level, seems to have depleted the space to increase productivity 
through inter-industry shifts, whereas Mexico still has some room.  
                                                          
9
 Note that for the case of Mexico, the incidence of the individual components for the period 1990-1994 is 
severely distorted. This reflects the relative magnitude of the components, with respect to the very small 
increase in productivity observed during the period.  
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Table 1 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on KLEMS data 
 
The decomposition of the contribution of inter-industry change in Mexico sheds light into 
the effect of the reallocation of resources across industries. The top panel shows that while 
the static effect has experienced an average annual rate of 0.5%, the dynamic effect has 
actually contracted by 0.2% on average.  
 
Examining the contributions of each of the components to total change, the bottom panel 
clearly indicates that the shifts in the relative weights of each industry with respect to total 
hours worked, i.e. the static effect, explains over 40% of total productivity growth. 
However, the negative sign on the contribution of the dynamic effects, which halves the 
Shift-share decomposition of labour productivity growth
1990-
1994
1995-
2000
2003-
2007
2010-
2011
1990-
2011
Annual average growth rates
Mexico
Labour productivity change 0.3% 2.2% 1.7% 2.8% 1.0%
Intraindustry effect 1.9% 2.3% 0.8% 2.0% 0.8%
Interindustry effect -1.7% -0.1% 1.0% 0.8% 0.2%
Static effect -1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 0.9% 0.5%
Dynamic Effect -0.5% -0.1% -0.3% 0.0% -0.2%
United States 
a
Labour productivity change 1.9% 2.3% 0.8% 2.7% 1.7%
Intraindustry effect 2.1% 2.6% 0.8% 2.9% 1.8%
Interindustry effect -2.7% -2.0% -3.4% -1.8% -2.5%
Static effect -2.7% -2.0% -3.4% -1.8% -2.5%
Dynamic Effect -2.5% -1.7% -3.5% -1.6% -2.3%
Contribution to aggregate labour productivity change
Mexico
Labour productivity change 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Intraindustry effect 654.7% 105.8% 44.1% 69.9% 77.1%
Interindustry effect -554.7% -5.8% 55.9% 30.1% 22.5%
Static effect -382.7% -0.7% 73.9% 31.3% 44.0%
Dynamic Effect -171.9% -5.1% -18.0% -1.2% -21.5%
United States 
b
Labour productivity change 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Intraindustry effect 105.0% 108.1% 99.4% 104.8% 102.8%
Interindustry effect -5.0% -8.1% 0.6% -4.8% -2.8%
Static effect -4.4% -7.6% 0.9% -4.9% -2.5%
Dynamic Effect -0.7% -0.6% -0.4% 0.1% -0.3%
Notes: a\ Since the series for the United States are chain-weighted, annual average volume growth rates are 
computed by first calculating the nominal growth rate, and then deflating by the corresponding Thornqvist index 
approximation to the Fisher ideal index (see Whelan 2000 for details)
b\ For the case of the United States the contribution of each component to aggregate labour productivity changes 
is approximated using nominal shares. 
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aggregate structural change effect, implies that on average the flows have been from 
industries with higher productivity growth towards industries with slower or contracting 
productivity growth. The labor market in both countries is highly dynamic, allowing for 
significant shifts among sectors. In the United States such shifts have been towards more 
productive sectors, while in Mexico towards industries with lower productivity. 
 
The decomposition by growth spells reveal that except for the first period, aggregate 
productivity in Mexico during expansion episodes has grown at rates that are comparable to 
those of the United States, and substantially higher during the period 2003-2007. This 
means that part of the lower productivity growth observed in Mexico for the full sample is 
explained by the losses that occur during crises.  
 
Indeed the data indicate that in the 1995 labor productivity contracted by 1.7% in Mexico 
and only 0.2% in the United States. Similarly, whereas labor productivity in Mexico fell by 
an average of 0.1% and 2.5% respectively during 2001 and the period 2008-2009, in the 
United States labor productivity grew by 2.3% and 1.1% respectively during the same 
periods. That is despite exhibiting comparable growth rates during growth spells, labor 
productivity in Mexico is markedly pro-cyclical during downturns, whereas it exhibits 
countercyclical behavior in the United States. 
 
In contrast to the prominent role of the intra-industry effect across growth phases for the 
United States, the main driver of productivity in Mexico has alternated from intra-industry 
improvements during the 1990s, to inter-industry changes over the period 2003-2007, and a 
smaller but still significant contribution of the change between industries in the most recent 
period. In fact the contribution of the aggregate inter-industry effect was negative during 
the first two periods, and only turned positive in the two most recent growth episodes.  
 
Analyzing the contribution of the components of the inter-industry effect, the data indicate 
that over the 1990s those industries with both the higher productivity levels and growth 
rates, evidenced respectively by the static and dynamic effects, saw their share in total 
hours worked diminished (see table 1). Whereas during the most recent decade, the static 
effect turned positive indicating that the labor share of industries with high productivity 
levels started increasing, the dynamic effect remained negative indicating that on average 
labor flowed away from the industries with the highest productivity growth rates and 
towards sectors with declining productivity levels. 
 
Taking advantage of the level of detail available in the data set, the analysis is further 
disaggregated with the purpose of identifying which groups of industries, if any, are driving 
the growth of aggregate labor productivity, and to identify the direction of labor flows 
across industries. In order to keep the analysis tractable, the industries are classified 
according to the taxonomy proposed by Castaldi (2009), which combines the taxonomies of 
Pavitt (1984) and of Miozzo and Soete (2001). The central idea behind the taxonomies is to 
classify industries according to both the sources and dynamics of innovation within 
industries. 
 
Manufacturing industries are classified into three categories: i) Scale intensive industries, 
whose efficiencies are to be found in the scale of their operations and whose innovations 
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are to be found mostly in the improvement of processes 10 ; ii) Supplier dominated 
industries, which are characterized by the fact that they derive the majority of their 
innovations from improvements embodied in the capital and intermediate goods provided 
by specialized suppliers11; and finally iii) Science-based and specialized suppliers which 
rely mainly on formal research activities to produce their own innovations.12 
 
Service industries are classified into analogous categories, with the exception that scale 
intensive services are further broken down into industries involved in the development and 
management of physical and information networks. In addition, within the classification of 
physical networks industries two subcategories are identified, the first contained industries 
related to trade activities and the second those involved in storage and distribution. This is 
done because despite the existence of large firms, trade in Mexico is characterized by the 
existence of a large number of small and mostly informal firms. 
 
In order to capture the flows of resources for the whole economy, three additional 
categories are also considered. The first includes producers of primary products; the 
second, labeled other production, includes construction and the provision of basic services, 
and finally a category for non-market services, which are services mainly provided by the 
state, is included. The details of the mapping of individual industries into the 
aforementioned categories are shown in table A in the appendix. 
 
Table 2 provides details of the contributions of the different industrial categories over the 
period 1990-201113. As before, the top panel presents the results for Mexico and the bottom 
panel those for the United States. The first row of each panel of table 2 replicates the 
magnitudes presented on the last column of the bottom panel of table 1. The rest of the 
rows show the contribution of each industrial category to the total aggregate.  
 
The Mexican economy is characterized by a dual structure: both primary products and 
manufacturing experienced positive productivity growth between 1990 and 2011, while 
almost all service categories showed a negative performance. In contrast, in the United 
States the increase in aggregate intra-industry productivity change is the result of a 
generalized increase across industrial categories.  
 
Manufacturing productivity growth in Mexico (2.4%) was much lower than in the same 
industry in the United States (4.6%), in spite of the close integration between those 
countries, in particular in this industry. The higher growth rate in the US was boosted by an 
impressive dynamism of science-based and specialized services manufacture (14.9%). In 
contrast, in Mexico this category, which in 2013 accounted for 38.4% of total exports, 
                                                          
10
 Of particular interest for the case of Mexico, this category includes the manufacture of transport equipment, 
chemical products, and food products and beverages. 
11
 This category includes textiles, apparel and paper products. 
12
 It comprises pharmaceuticals, electronic goods and components, scientific instruments and electrical 
machinery and equipment. Pavitt’s original taxonomy distinguishes between science-based and specialized 
suppliers. Yet this paper groups them together because in Mexico they present similar features regarding 
innovation sources and dynamics. 
13
 In the interest of brevity the results for the growth episodes are omitted. However they are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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showed a meager performance (0.7%). This fact illustrates that although industries such as 
electronics, aeronautics and scientific instruments are considered knowledge industries in 
developed economies, in Mexico they are dominated by labor and scale-intensive process 
with much lower productivity growth (Padilla-Pérez and Hérnandez, 2010). 
 
Table 2 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on KLEMS data 
 
Productivity growth in the United States was also higher in supplier-dominated 
manufactures (3% versus 0.6% in Mexico), but not in scale-intensive manufactures (1.4% 
versus 3.1%). The latter, which accounted for 35.6% of total exports of goods in Mexico in 
2013 and comprises industries such as transport equipment, food products and beverages, 
has experienced significant productivity growth based mainly on process innovations and 
acquisition of machinery and equipment (Padilla-Pérez and Hernández, 2010; Abdel-
Musik, 2004). 
 
In addition, substantial differences regarding the relative importance of the different 
categories are observed. In Mexico the main driver of intra-industry productivity growth 
Incidence on the change in aggregate labour productivity
Interindustry effect
Average aggregate 
growth rate      
1990-2011
Intraindustry 
effect Static Dynamic Total
Mexico
Total industries 1.0% 77.1% 44.0% -21.5% 22.5%
Primary products 0.8% 20.3% -20.4% -7.2% -27.6%
Manufacturing 2.4% 50.2% -29.8% -4.9% -34.7%
Scale intensive 3.1% 46.0% -25.5% -4.0% -29.4%
Supplier dominated 0.6% 1.4% -4.5% -0.6% -5.1%
Science-based and specialised suppliers 0.7% 2.8% 0.1% -0.3% -0.2%
Other production -0.9% -1.8% 6.0% -1.1% 5.0%
Market services 0.7% 14.4% 89.7% -7.0% 82.7%
Supplier dominated services -0.6% -1.7% 1.5% -0.4% 1.1%
Scale intensive services: Physical networks -0.3% -5.8% 32.9% -1.2% 31.8%
Trade -0.3% -4.7% 26.9% -1.1% 25.9%
Transport and Storage -0.3% -1.1% 6.0% -0.1% 5.9%
Scale intensive services: Information networks 3.1% 27.7% 45.8% -4.9% 40.9%
Knowledge intensive business services -1.3% -5.8% 9.5% -0.5% 8.9%
Non-market services -0.7% -6.0% -1.5% -1.3% -2.8%
United States
Total industries 1.7% 102.8% -2.5% -0.3% -2.8%
Primary products 1.1% 2.3% -0.1% 0.1% -0.1%
Manufacturing 4.6% 17.6% -8.6% -0.4% -9.0%
Scale intensive 1.4% 8.9% -3.8% -0.2% -4.0%
Supplier dominated 3.0% 3.7% -2.5% -0.1% -2.6%
Science-based and specialised suppliers 14.9% 5.0% -2.2% -0.2% -2.4%
Other production -1.1% 5.3% -1.2% 0.0% -1.2%
Market services 2.1% 57.6% 3.0% 0.0% 3.0%
Supplier dominated services 0.0% 5.7% 1.2% 0.0% 1.2%
Scale intensive services: Physical networks 3.2% 11.8% -0.5% 0.0% -0.5%
Trade 3.8% 9.5% -0.7% 0.0% -0.8%
Transport and Storage 2.1% 2.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3%
Scale intensive services: Information networks 2.9% 25.5% -0.9% -0.1% -1.0%
Knowledge intensive business services 1.7% 14.6% 3.3% 0.1% 3.4%
Non-market services -0.1% 20.0% 4.3% 0.1% 4.5%
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has been manufacturing, with the scale intensive products category explaining almost 60% 
of aggregate within industry change, followed by information networks and primary 
products. Information networks comprise telecommunications and banking, which have 
been characterized by the introduction of new technologies over the past two decades.14 In 
contrast, intra-industry productivity growth in science-based and specialized suppliers and 
supplier-dominated manufactures was meager. 
 
For its part, in the United States information networks is the most dynamic sector, whereas 
taken together manufacturing and primary products account for less than 20% of aggregate 
intra-industry productivity growth. It is interesting to note that despite the differences in 
industrial composition between the two countries, the incidence of information networks is 
very similar. 
 
Since in general the contribution of inter-industry changes to productivity in the United 
States is relatively small and thus not comparable to Mexico, in the remainder of this 
section the analysis focuses on the sources of aggregate inter-industry change for Mexico. 
 
The second column of table 2 shows the contribution of the static inter-industry effect, 
which as discussed above is positive (negative) for those categories whose share in total 
hours worked increased (decreased) during the period studied.  Consistent with the 
traditional story of structural change, there has been a diminution of hours worked in the 
primary products sector. Yet instead of observing a flow into manufacturing, a massive 
flow into market services is experienced.  
 
Although the aggregate effect of this recomposition of hours worked across sectors is 
positive, the results in the third column show that the reallocation has been less than 
efficient, since the generalized negative sign signifies that either industrial categories with 
high intra-industry productivity growth rates, such as scale intensive activities, are reducing 
their share in total hours worked, or labor is flowing towards sectors whose within industry 
productivity is falling, such as trade.  
 
Within the scale intensive sector, the main determinant of the decrease of the dynamic 
effect is the food and beverages industry, which despite substantial productivity gains has 
dramatically reduced its share of total hours worked. For its part auto manufacturing, which 
posted similar productivity gains, has mostly maintained its labor share. In contrast the 
negative dynamic effect observed for trade is explained by the general decline of 
productivity within the sector, which as already mentioned is characterized by a large 
number of small informal enterprises.  
 
Finally an interesting case is provided by information networks which despite having 
increased its overall share of hours worked, as evidenced by its positive static effect, and its 
important gains in productivity growth, shows a negative dynamic effect. This result is 
driven by the flow of hours worked into real estate activities whose productivity fell over 
the study period. The effect was only partially offset by the increase in labor share of 
financial intermediation, whose productivity grew over the period. 
                                                          
14
 See, for instance, OECD (2000). 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Over the last two decades, Mexico has gone through an incomplete or unfinished structural 
change process. There has been a shift towards more knowledge-intensive industries, the 
production matrix has been diversified and exports have oriented successfully towards 
dynamic markets. Yet productivity growth has been insufficient and way below that of its 
main trade partner, the United States. Furthermore, structural change has resulted in shifts 
of labor force from sectors with high productivity growth to those with low productivity 
expansion. 
 
The analysis shows that labor productivity growth in Mexico was significantly lower than 
that of the United States between 1990 and 2011. Consequently, productivity gap between 
those countries widened, in spite of their increasing trade integration. When the analysis is 
decomposed by economic cycles, during economic expansion periods in Mexico, its labor 
productivity has grown at a similar rate than US’. However, economic downturns have 
been both more frequent and deeper in the former, impacting negatively the annual average 
growth rate. 
 
Intra-industry productivity growth in Mexico was positive between 1990 and 2011, but it 
had a limited impact in total productivity growth, although it is still an emerging country 
and, theoretically, it should have more room for structural change arising from shifts 
between sectors. As for inter-industry productivity growth, scale-intensive manufactures 
and information network services exhibited the highest annual growth rates. Yet 
manufacturing released workers to less productive sectors, such as market services. In 
effect, the inter-industry component had a positive contribution to total productivity 
growth, but its contribution was hindered by the shift towards less dynamic sectors. 
 
The new economic model achieved has successfully achieved some of its main goals: 
export competitiveness, production diversification, closer integration with the United States 
economy and a shift towards more complex industries. However, these achievements have 
not been accompanied by robust productivity growth, having negative effects on economic 
growth and social development. 
 
This paper analyzed the role of the reallocation of hours worked across industries over the 
period 1990-2011 in the determination of labor productivity growth, disaggregating sectoral 
dynamics. The shift-share exercise shows a clear dual structure: primary products, 
manufacturing and information network services experienced productivity growth in 1990-
2011. Scale-intensive manufactures and information network services observed higher 
growth than in the United States. In contrast, labor productivity decreased in all other 
services in the same period. 
 
The empirical analysis also shows that the participation of manufacturing in total labor 
force decreased over the last two decades in Mexico. Developed countries have gone 
through similar processes of deindustrialization. However, in Mexico this process has taken 
place under low aggregate productivity growth, mainly due to shifts from dynamic sectors 
(manufacturing) to declining sectors (market services). 
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As mentioned, there is a second factor behind the weak association between export 
dynamism and economic growth: feeble linkages between the export sector and the rest of 
the economy, therefore generating limited domestic value added. Exports are highly 
concentrated in a few large export-oriented manufacturing firms whose backward linkages 
are scant.  This second factor has been increasingly studied by domestic and international 
organizations, such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, based on input-output 
matrices. 
 
Three final remarks emerge from the analysis. First, active public policies are needed to 
foster productivity growth in all sectors. The gigantic difference in productivity growth 
between science-based and specialized suppliers manufactures in the United States and 
Mexico illustrates that the shift towards more complex industries in the former country has 
not been accompanied by increasing innovation capabilities. Policies to support human 
capital formation, research and development activities and infrastructure, among others, are 
needed to strengthen productivity growth. Following Abramovitz (1986), a country has 
strong potential for productivity growth, as a result of economic integration with a 
technologically-advanced nation, if it has previously developed social capabilities. 
 
Second, low productivity growth in market services is closely associated with a large 
informal sector. Micro and small-sized firms that do not have access to credit and new 
sources of knowledge and technologies, struggle hard to increase productivity. Since 
market services are attracting a significant amount to labor force released by more 
productive sectors, public policies are urgently needed to support the informal sector. 
 
Third, economic crises over the last two decades have hindered significantly long-term 
productivity growth in Mexico. During economic growth periods between 1995 and 2011, 
the productivity gap between the United States and Mexico has been reduced. Economic 
crises as a result of both domestic and external shocks have had a disruptive effect on 
productivity growth in Mexico. Counter-cyclical economic policies, which pay more 
attention to real stability rather than to nominal, are also needed. 
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Appendix 
Table A 
Industry 
ISIC 
rev. 3 Category 
Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 1 Primary products 
Forestry, logging and related service activities 2 Primary products 
Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service 
activities incidental to fishing 5 Primary products 
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 10 Primary products 
Extraction of crude petroleum, natural gas and incidental service 
activities 11 Primary products 
Mining of uranium and thorium ores 12 Primary products 
Mining of metal ores 13 Primary products 
Other mining and quarrying 14 Primary products 
Food products and beverages 15 Scale intensive 
Tobacco products 16 Scale intensive 
Textiles 17 Supplier dominated 
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 18 Supplier dominated 
Leather and footwear 19 Supplier dominated 
Wood and of products of wood and cork 20 Supplier dominated 
Paper and paper products 21 Supplier dominated 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 Supplier dominated 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 Scale intensive 
Pharmaceuticals 244 
Science-based and specialized 
suppliers 
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 24x Scale intensive 
Rubber and plastics products 25 Scale intensive 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 Scale intensive 
Basic metals 27 Scale intensive 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 28 Scale intensive 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 
Science based and specialized 
suppliers 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 
Science based and specialized 
suppliers 
Insulated wire and cable 313 Supplier dominated 
Other electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 31x 
Science based and specialized 
suppliers 
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 32 
Science based and specialized 
suppliers 
Scientific instruments 331t3 
Science based and specialized 
suppliers 
Other instruments 334t5 Scale intensive 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 Scale intensive 
Other transport equipment 35 Scale intensive 
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 36 Supplier dominated 
Recycling 37 Supplier dominated 
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Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 40 Other Production 
Collection, purification and distribution of water 41 Other Production 
Construction 45 Other Production 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
retail sale of automotive fuel 50 Physical networks (Trade) 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 51 Physical networks (Trade) 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
personal and household goods 52 Physical networks (Trade) 
Hotels and restaurants 55 Supplier dominated services 
Land transport; transport via pipelines 60 
Physical networks (Storage and 
Distribution) 
Water transport 61 
Physical networks (Storage and 
Distribution) 
Air transport 62 
Physical networks (Storage and 
Distribution) 
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel 
agencies 63 
Physical networks (Storage and 
Distribution) 
Post and telecommunications 64 Information networks 
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 65 Information networks 
Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 66 Information networks 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 67 Information networks 
Real estate activities 70 Information networks 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of 
personal and household goods 71 Supplier dominated services 
Computer and related activities 72 
Knowledge intensive business 
services 
Research and development 73 
Knowledge intensive business 
services 
Other business activities 74 
Knowledge intensive business 
services 
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 75 Non market services 
Education 80 Non market services 
Health and social work 85 Non market services 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 90 Supplier dominated services 
Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 91 Supplier dominated services 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 92 Supplier dominated services 
Other service activities 93 Supplier dominated services 
Private households with employed persons 95 Supplier dominated services 
 
